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BUILDING CAPACITY FOR THE TRANSNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF MIGRATION 
Cristina M. Rodríguez* 
Two significant conceptual errors frame the public debate 
concerning labor migration and the related phenomenon of illegal 
immigration.  Each error stems from lawmakers’ failure or refusal to 
recognize the ongoing and transnational nature of migration.  First, the 
immigration debate occurs largely within a domestic political framework, 
and the assumption that the United States can address immigration 
issues, particularly illegal immigration, through the perfection of 
domestic enforcement mechanisms pervades the discourse.  But 
migration is inherently international, and its management requires 
engagement with other governments and with social facts beyond U.S. 
control.  Second, the rhetorical emphasis placed on “fixing” our broken 
regime reflects a conception of immigration as a problem to be solved.  
But migration is a cross-border phenomenon produced by structural and 
historical factors that will only evolve, rather than disappear, and it 
therefore requires transnational management, rather than a one-time 
comprehensive legislative solution. 
Regulating immigration ultimately requires lawmakers to reach 
beyond a unilateral “gatekeeping” strategy defined by efforts to stop 
migration through law enforcement and economic coercion.  Because 
states cannot effectively manage migration in isolation from one 
another,1 the United States must approach the issue by prioritizing 
cooperation with actors outside the United States.  In their contributions 
to the policy debate, scholars increasingly have emphasized the 
importance of addressing labor and illegal migration through bilateral 
and transnational frameworks2—through accords that would recognize 
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1. Bimal Ghosh, Managing Migration:  Interstate Cooperation at the Global Level, in 
Interstate Cooperation and Migration 109, 111 (2005).  
2. See, e.g., Jorge A. Bustamante, Mexico-United States Labor Migration Flows, 31 
Int’l Migration Rev. 1112, 1112 (1997) (noting that outmigration in Mexico is perceived 
as economic and labor phenomenon from which United States reaps benefits, whereas in 
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the interdependence of the United States and Mexico and engage our 
neighbor to the south directly through joint efforts to channel migratory 
flows. 
In this Essay, I seek to contribute to this strand of commentary by 
focusing on the actual mechanisms of transnationalism and the avenues 
they open up for advancing a meaningful bilateralism.  I demonstrate 
that the cross-border administrative law space created by these 
mechanisms is occupied not just by international entities, but also by 
entanglements between the domestic institutions of different countries.  
I emphasize the importance of identifying and then building the 
mechanisms of bilateralism, or the cross-border institutional capacities 
needed for managing migration, in a manner that promotes burden-
sharing, or that ensures that both sides of the bilateral relationship reap 
benefits and bear costs, in rough proportion. 
Many transnational mechanisms of governance already exist, and I 
use this space to advance the conversation about transnational 
regulation by mapping some of them and then offering initial 
suggestions for their development.  For the sake of simplicity, I focus on 
the U.S.-Mexico relationship, not least because immigration to the 
United States is overwhelmingly Mexican (twenty percent of the 
authorized population and fifty-six percent of the unauthorized 
population),3 and because ninety-eight percent of Mexico’s out-
migration is to the United States.4  Our shared border is also itself the 
source and site of many of the pressures that make immigration a 
significant public policy issue.  
Bringing to light existing institutional frameworks might also help 
to calm the passions that arise from the popular assumption that the 
United States and Mexico are locked in an adversarial relationship in 
 
United States, same migration is perceived as law and order or public safety 
phenomenon); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 503, 
509 (2007) (“I propose an opening up of the fortress of labor and of the nation-state to 
accommodate a constant flow of new migrants through a model that would tie 
immigration status to membership in organizations of transnational workers rather than 
to a particular employer.”); Alejandro Portes, The Fence to Nowhere, Am. Prospect, Oct. 
2007, at 26, 28 (arguing that United States and Mexico must develop means to manage 
massive flow of migration); Marc Rosenblum, The United States and Mexico:  Prospects 
for a Bilateral Migration Policy, Border Battles:  The U.S. Immigration Debates, Mar. 8, 
2007, at http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Rosenblum/printable.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (detailing fraught history of U.S.-Mexico bilateralism and laying out 
agenda for bilateral accord).  For discussion of the history of U.S.-Mexico bilateralism and 
its limitations as reflected in the World War II-era Bracero program, see Mae M. Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects:  Illegal Immigrants and the Making of Modern America 138–47 
(2005); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
Yale L.J. 458, 485–91 (2009).  
3. Andrew Selee, Woodrow Wilson Ctr., More Than Neighbors:  An Overview of 
Mexico and U.S.-Mexico Relations 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Mexico.More%20Than%20Neighbors.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
4. David Fitzgerald, A Nation of Emigrants:  How Mexico Manages its Migration 5–6 
(2009). 
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relation to migration.  This relationship is not without its tensions, of 
course.  Actors on either side of the border have different sets of 
priorities.  Both the United States and Mexico have interests in 
controlling smuggling, drug trafficking (and the associated extreme 
violence), and other criminal activity around the border.  But on the 
subject of immigration, Mexico’s objectives revolve primarily around 
protecting the interests of its nationals abroad and facilitating remittance 
traffic back to Mexico,5 whereas the United States’s interests focus on 
simultaneously serving the country’s labor market needs and preventing 
immigration from having adverse effects on U.S. workers and federal, 
state, and local budgets.  This divergence of interest makes efforts to 
cooperate fraught and gives rise to collective action difficulties.  The 
asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the United States and 
Mexico further complicates the matter; the United States possesses 
superior bargaining power and economic strength.6  But it is precisely 
because of these asymmetries that developing institutional frameworks 
for cooperation is vital to meeting the regulatory challenge posed by the 
shared border, and the shared interest in managing migration creates 
crucial commonality. 
I.  THE MECHANISMS OF BILATERALISM IN THE U.S.-MEXICO 
RELATIONSHIP 
The mechanisms of bilateralism exist in at least three forms:  (1) 
diplomatic and information-sharing networks that involve consultation 
and conferencing among cabinet officials and agency heads in both the 
United States and Mexico; (2) actual cooperative ventures between 
administrative officials on both sides of the border; and (3) civil society 
networks (many of which do not involve state actors) developed to serve 
the needs of Mexican migrants inside the United States.  These 
frameworks are defined by different degrees of formality and thus have 
varying relationships to the hard legal regimes of the United States and 
Mexico.  Most of them do not have legal regulatory authority, though 
they do reflect how the sovereign power and local interests of each 
nation project across the border.  In addition, these mechanisms make 
 
5. In 2005, remittances amounted to approximately twenty billion dollars.  See id. at 
63.  Though the current recession has led to a decline in this traffic of late, see Joel 
Millman, Remittances to Mexico Fall More Than Forecast, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at A3 
(noting that amount of money sent home by Mexicans working in United States dropped 
by 3.6% in 2008—first decline recorded since Mexico began tracking remittance traffic 
thirteen years ago), the decline in remittances to Latin America may be “bottoming out,” 
Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra & Ani Silwal, Migration and Development Brief 11, 
Migration and Remittance Trends 2009, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“Remittance flows to Mexico declined by 13.4 percent in the first nine months of 
2009 . . . . However, the decline in flows appears to be bottoming out in most countries 
across the region.”). 
6. Selee, supra note 3, at iii; Ghosh, supra note 1, at 121–22. 
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clear that migration management depends on activity—sometimes 
collaborative, sometimes isolated—by officials at all levels of government 
and in the private sector. 
A.  Diplomatic and Information-Sharing Networks 
The U.S. Department of State and the Mexican Foreign Ministry 
clearly communicate over issues of mutual concern, but it is also the case 
that almost every agency head deals regularly and directly with his or her 
counterpart on the other side of the border.7  Perhaps the most 
prominent example of such interaction is the U.S.-Mexico Binational 
Commission (BNC), originally established in 1981 and envisioned as a 
forum for cabinet-level officials to meet once or twice a year to discuss 
regulatory issues related to the binational relationship.  Over time, the 
BNC has become a one-day conference chaired by the U.S. Secretary of 
State and the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations and attended by 
cabinet-level officials and heads of administrative agencies.  The Clinton 
Administration, in particular, invested heavily in this project,8 and 
migration and border security have become prominent among the 
Commission’s agenda items.9  The governors of border states in both 
countries have developed a similar network of their own,10 and mayors in 
neighboring towns maintain close working relationships.  State and local 
officials in both countries increasingly reach across the border to attract 
new forms of investment.  In the United States, state and local officials 
also work to respond to the transnational interests of their new popular 
constituencies of Mexican origin, by facilitating trade, investment, and 
cross-border traffic. 
The tangible accomplishments of these gatherings are few.  But 
formal networks of this kind at least promote information sharing across 
governments, as well as the articulation of joint priorities.  Most 
 
7. Selee, supra note 3, at 13. 
8. Augustin Escobar, Interstate Cooperation:  The Americas, in Interstate 
Cooperation and Migration, supra note 1, at 65, 80. 
9. See, e.g., K. Larry Storrs, Cong. Research Serv., Mexico-United States Dialogue on 
Migration and Border Issues, 2001–2005, at 5–6 (2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32735.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(discussing meeting of November 25–26, 2002, during which talks addressed importance 
of forging bilateral migration accord and joint border security initiatives). 
10. The first border governors’ conference took place in Ciudad Juarez in June 1980 
and resulted, in part, from the efforts of Governor Clements of Texas, who had promised 
during his campaign to improve relations with Mexico.  John Kincaid, The American 
Governors in International Affairs, Publius:  J. of Federalism, Fall 1984, at 95, 111.  The 
conference is designed to enable governors to develop proposals for reform on border-
related matters that can be submitted to their respective state and national governments, 
but through consultation with their counterparts on the other side of the border.  The 
conference consists of thirteen working groups focused on issue areas that include 
agriculture, border security, crossings, economic development, education, emergency 
matters, energy, environment, health, science, tourism, water, and wildlife. See Border 
Governors Conference, Worktables, at http://www.bordergovernors.ca.gov/worktables 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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important, when taken seriously, these networks can build and sustain 
the political will necessary to advance bilateral cooperation through the 
creation of actual legal regimes.  They can also help project the 
particular interests of the United States and Mexico into the domestic 
political debate of the other country, to ensure that the interests of U.S. 
and Mexican citizens receive recognition in the national decisionmaking 
processes over which they have no direct control.11 
The Partnership for Prosperity—a public-private partnership 
initiated by Presidents Bush and Fox in 2001—offers another example 
of an information-sharing network created by high level officials to 
advance a tangible reform agenda through reliance on cooperation 
between bureaucrats and the private sector.  The Partnership promotes 
development in Mexico, particularly in areas with high rates of out-
migration to the United States.12  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell 
has listed the Partnership’s accomplishments as including lowering the 
fees for transferring money between the United States and Mexico, 
developing innovative methods for funding infrastructure projects, and 
establishing an Overseas Private Investment Corporation in Mexico to 
provide over $600 million in various types of financing to U.S. businesses 
operating in Mexico.13 
B.  The Cross-Border Work of Administrative Agencies 
Administrative agencies on both sides of the border, particularly in 
the areas of law enforcement and public health, work together to 
develop actual practices that advance mutual goals, as well as to 
streamline operations that involve officials from both countries.  With 
respect to border security, cooperation by state officials has been a 
longstanding practice.  Again, this relationship has been complicated by 
different priorities, with Mexico focused on matters of internal security 
and protecting the lives and rights of its nationals at the border, and the 
United States focused on terrorism-related screening and intelligence 
gathering, as well as drug interdiction.14  But Presidents Clinton and 
Zedillo poured considerable effort into formalizing bilateral 
 
11. Another such network is the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM), a 
multilateral regional meeting that has occurred annually since 1996.  The RCM is 
attended by eleven member states, including the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and 
its objectives include promoting the orderly movement of persons and respect for the 
human rights of migrants.  Reg’l Conference on Migration, Conference Description, at 
http://www.rcmvs.org/pagina_n.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
12. P’ship for Prosperity, Report to President Vicente Fox and President George W. 
Bush:  Creating Prosperity Through Partnership 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16197.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
13. Storrs, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
14. Andrés Rozental & Peter H. Smith, Woodrow Wilson Ctr. Mex. Inst., The United 
States and Mexico:  Forging a Strategic Partnership 11 (2005), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/USMEXenglish%20copy1.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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consultation between consulates and border agencies.  In 2002, the two 
countries entered into the so-called “Smart Border Agreement” (SBA) 
designed to increase the number of secure documents for frequent 
border crossers, improve intelligence sharing, and implement security 
strategies focused not just on the border, but also on the areas where 
threats originate.  Initiatives also have included simplifying the execution 
of arrest warrants on either side of the border by reducing the legal 
obstacles that prevent warrants from either country from being honored 
in the other, as well as removing obstacles to collaboration between law 
enforcement officials.  Perhaps most important, the SBA has brought 
attention to the need to regularize migratory flows in order to free up 
larger amounts of scarce law enforcement resources to address public 
safety and national security issues.15 
On the subject of public health, perhaps the most formal existing 
mechanism of cooperation is the United States-Mexico Border Health 
Commission, which was established under the auspices of Public Law 
103-400 and through a Memorandum of Agreement between the 
governments of the United States and Mexico.16  Membership consists of 
high-level government officials from federal and state health agencies in 
both countries, as well as political appointees.  The Commission’s 
primary objective is to deal with mobile public health crises and to 
address the needs for internal and external forms of communication and 
technical harmonization.17  The Commission also continues to work 
toward facilitating binational health insurance to cover Mexican 
nationals working in the United States and to address legal barriers to 
coverage, such as a Texas state law that does not permit HMOs to market 
insurance plans across the border.18 
Perhaps the most notable initiative to emerge from the Commission 
is its support for the Ventanillas de Salud program, through which 
Mexican consulates (there are fifty inside the United States) collaborate 
with U.S. nonprofit health organizations to provide services and 
education to Mexican citizens living and working in the United States.19  
 
15. Id. at 12. 
16. United States-Mexico Border Health Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-400, 108 
Stat. 4169 (1994) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 290n–290n-6 (2006)); Agreement 
to Establish a United States-Mexico Border Health Commission, U.S.-Mex., July 14–24, 
2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13107, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126990.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review).  
17. For a history of such efforts, see Julie Collins-Dogrul, Managing U.S.-Mexico 
“Border Health”:  An Organizational Field Approach, 63 Soc. Sci. & Med. 3199 (2006). 
18. See U.S.-Mex. Border Health Comm’n, Annual Meeting of the United States-
Mexico Border Health Commission, McAllen, Texas, March 3–4, 2008:  Summary, Actions 
and Next Steps 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.borderhealth.org/extranet/files/file_1058.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (reporting on work of H.H.S. Working Group on Binational Health Insurance). 
19. See Hilda Bogue, Ventanillas de Salud Program and Community Health Centers, 
Migrant Health Newsline, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6843/is_6_23/ai_n28465712 (on file with the 
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Twelve such programs existed as of 2008, and they provide direct services 
to 500,000 “consulate clients,” reaching an estimated 1.5 million people 
in the U.S.  A combination of Mexican state funds and private grants 
provides financial support for the programs, which focus primarily on 
disseminating occupational health and safety-related information and 
referring clients for services in Mexico.20 
C.  Transnational Civil Society Networks 
Several transnational civil society networks have taken shape in the 
last few decades and have created structures for the delivery of social 
services and the protection of Mexican nationals’ interests abroad.21  
Some of these mechanisms are creatures of the state, such as the 
Ventanillas de Salud program, and others emerge via networks of private 
actors.  Indeed, emigration countries generally have begun adopting 
policies to address the rights and interests of migrants abroad, and to 
provide incentives for them to return home.22  The attempts by sending 
societies, such as Mexico, to both provide for and control their nationals 
abroad simultaneously alleviate some of the burden felt by U.S. 
institutions and inject the sending state and its civil society into life in 
the United States. 
Two examples of the increasingly vibrant civil society networks that 
have emerged include nongovernmental hometown associations and the 
Institute for Mexicans Abroad, which was formed in 2003 to replace the 
Mexican Communities Abroad Program.  The hometown associations 
and migrant federations have evolved as informal networks that connect 
migrants in the United States to citizens and organizations in towns in 
Mexico.  They consist of business associations, labor unions, and 
churches23 on both sides of the border.  In addition to organizing social 
and civic events, the associations develop positions on binational issues, 
 
Columbia Law Review) (describing goals and benefits of program to decrease barriers to 
access among consular clients and their families). 
20. U.S.-Mex. Border Health Comm’n, NIOSH Information Dissemination on the 
U.S.-Mexico Border, at http://www.borderhealth.org/files/res_1203.pdf (last updated 
Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
21. For a general account of this transnational activity, see Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, 
Binational Organizations of Mexican Migrants in the United States, Soc. Just., Fall 1999, at 
27.  For a framing of this civil society activity as political activity and organization by 
Mexican migrants, see Jonathan Fox, Mexican Migrant Civic Participation in the United 
States, Border Battles:  The U.S. Immigration Debates, Aug. 15, 2006, at 
http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Fox/printable.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
22. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 3, 155–64 (describing ways in which Mexican 
government has attempted to regulate emigration). 
23. The Catholic Church, itself a global, transnational network, has become an 
important agent for the promotion of migrants’ interests in recent years.  The Mexican 
Catholic Church has abandoned its former policy of discouraging emigration in favor of 
accepting emigration and maintaining connections to Mexicans abroad via partnerships 
with U.S. dioceses and a “binational migrant ministry,” simultaneously encouraging 
Mexicans to retain ties to Mexican culture and society and learn English and American 
customs.  See id. at 96. 
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and their component parts maintain close relations with one another.  
Some associations actually participate in and help fund development 
projects in both the United States and Mexico,24 and the Mexican 
government finances association projects through its consulates in the 
United States.25 
The Institute for Mexicans Abroad similarly exists to provide services 
to Mexicans living in the United States, while simultaneously promoting 
understanding of Mexican culture in receiving communities and 
facilitating immigrant integration.  Housed in Mexico’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Institute works through the Mexican consulates in 
the United States and partners with civic actors on both sides of the 
border.26  When it was still the Communities Abroad Program, the 
Institute began the “Tres por Uno” program, through which migrants 
abroad and Mexican government agencies finance infrastructure 
projects in Mexico, spending eighty million dollars per year by 2005.27  
Today, the Institute’s advisory council consists of Mexican community 
leaders, Latino organizations in the United States, and officials from the 
state governments of Mexico.28  The Institute cosponsors social programs 
with agencies at all levels of government.  In addition to coordinating 
the Ventanillas de Salud program in the United States,29 the Institute 
works with school districts to assess the needs of migrant school children 
and provides Mexican nationals with financial literacy workshops and 
English-language and continuing adult education programs.30  The 
Institute’s objectives also include public diplomacy efforts in the United 
States designed to enhance respect for the culture and country of 
Mexico, in order to address the hostility toward Mexicans and Mexican 
culture generated by illegal immigration.31  This promotion of 
understanding helps to create political space for the treatment of 
immigration as a humanitarian and regulatory issue, rather than as a law 
enforcement problem. 
 
24. See Selee, supra note 3, at 18 (describing cross-border activities of 
nongovernmental organizations). 
25. Rivera-Salgado, supra note 21, at 30. 
26. For a detailed discussion of the Institute’s structure, see Laureen Laglagaron, 
Migration Policy Inst., Protection Through Integration:  The Mexican Government’s 
Efforts to Aid Migrants in the United States 10–14 (2010), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/IME-Jan2010.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
27. Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 58–59. 
28. Id. 
29. Laglagaron, supra note 26, at 29–31. 
30. Id. at 1–2, 14–28; see also Rodolfo Figueroa-Aramoni, A Nation Beyond its 
Borders:  The Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, 86 J. Am. Hist. 537, 539–40 
(1999) (discussing educational and cultural activities of Institute’s predecessor).  
31. See Claudia Keller Lapayre, The Institute of Mexicans Abroad as a Mexican 
Institution of Public Diplomacy in the United States 24 (Mar. 22, 2006) (paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p99314_index.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (noting that Institute’s programs, though targeted at Mexican nationals, also seek 
to “improve Mexico’s image”). 
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II.  SHAPING THE FUTURE OF BILATERALISM 
The existing mechanisms of bilateralism form an intricate 
constellation of institutions designed to address the multiple needs 
engendered by immigration between Mexico and the United States.  
These mechanisms are largely ad hoc, however.32  Efforts to develop an 
overarching normative framework could prove stultifying, but some 
theoretical cohesion will be required to shift the focus of public debate 
toward bilateralism, given the many different forms of governance 
needed to negotiate the U.S.-Mexico relationship. 
The mechanisms just discussed all embody an ethic of burden 
sharing and reflect the crucial insight that when countries have large 
populations in common, both sides of the border should benefit from 
and bear responsibility for those populations.  The civil society networks, 
in particular, reflect the burden-sharing ethos, demonstrating through 
actual practice a commitment to treating migration as a binational 
responsibility requiring transnational mechanisms of governance.  The 
concepts of “burden sharing” (or mutual obligation) and 
“management” (or regulation) thus offer general but sufficiently 
substantive umbrella ideas under which to develop the mechanisms of 
bilateralism.  This shared responsibility ultimately can be realized 
through an agenda that builds the existing institutional capacities 
described above to (1) address the root causes of migration and (2) 
manage migration’s effects to promote public health, safety, and 
prosperity, as well as human rights. 
With respect to the first set of priorities—addressing the root causes 
of migration—the concepts of burden sharing and management ought 
to be highlighted at the diplomatic level as governing principles for the 
U.S.-Mexico relationship.  The foregoing discussion should make clear 
that the Mexican government takes the interests of its emigrating 
nationals and the impact of their movement on Mexico and the United 
States quite seriously,33 but it remains crucial for high-ranking U.S. 
officials to apply consistent pressure on Mexico to address the 
underlying structural causes of migration, especially limited job 
opportunities and structural inequalities at home.  Perhaps more 
important, the United States should commit diplomatically to assisting 
Mexico in this long-term, cause-based approach to stabilizing and 
reducing migration.34 
 
32. See Ghosh, supra note 1, at 115 (observing that existing mechanisms of interstate 
cooperation act “in an isolated and fragmentary manner and are too narrowly focused to 
provide an adequate normative framework for a comprehensive approach to migration 
management”). 
33. See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 155 (noting that Mexico sought from 1900 to 
1970 to control “volume, trip duration, skills, and geographic origin of emigrants” 
through mechanisms such as propaganda, withholding of travel documents, Bracero 
temporary worker program, and coercion at border, but that failure of such efforts led 
Mexico to shift strategy to management). 
34. For an argument that substantial investment by the United States in Mexico 
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At the administrative level, this approach could require diminished 
reliance by Mexico on remittances as a tool of development, especially 
since monies sent home from abroad offer only short-term and 
individualized (rather than systemic) development assistance.  It could 
include devising positive incentives for Mexican migrants to return 
home, such as business loans or educational grants, to be jointly funded 
and implemented by Mexico and the United States.  Increased funding 
and technical support from U.S. agencies to arrangements like the 
Partnership for Prosperity could help expand the reach of preexisting 
development initiatives.  Some commentators also have advocated 
increased utilization of the North American Development Bank, an 
institution created in 1994 in a side agreement to NAFTA.  To transform 
the Bank into a collaborative mechanism of development, both its 
substantive and geographic mandates would need to be expanded 
beyond their original focus on the environment.35 
The second set of priorities, which revolves around regularization 
and management of existing flows, is crucial to creating a climate in 
which migration is seen as a win-win proposition, rather than as an 
imposition on the United States and a drain on Mexico.  Regularization 
will require a labor accord of some kind, the details of which are well 
beyond the scope of this Essay.36  But at the very least, transnational, 
interagency cooperation should be part of any new labor regime.  For 
example, federal and state agencies37 in Mexico can assist in providing 
crucial data and economic and demographic projections regarding the 
Mexican labor market and the sources, numbers, and characteristics of 
likely Mexican migrants.38  The network of Mexican consulates, which 
 
represents the best long-term strategy for reducing illegal immigration, see Jorge Durand 
& Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Sanity, Am. Prospect, Sept. 24–Oct. 8, 2001, at 28. 
35. See Rozental & Smith, supra note 14, at 16 (describing expanding the mandate 
of the North American Development Bank as one approach to infrastructure 
development).  Of course, this sort of measure could be politically unpalatable, given that 
NAFTA is perceived on both sides of the border as having failed to deliver the growth in 
Mexico that would prevent the erosion of jobs and wages in the United States.  See, e.g., 
Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand & Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors:  
Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration 73–104 (2002) (discussing 
relationship between NAFTA and illegal immigration). 
36. For literature offering various approaches, see sources cited supra note 2.  For a 
critique of temporary worker programs, see generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest 
Workers and Integration:  Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One 
Another, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 219. 
37. State and local governments in Mexico, which have become increasingly 
independent as the result of the federal government’s devolution to them, in the mid-
1990s, of authority over education and health care, should not be overlooked as partners 
in regulation and information gathering.  See Selee, supra note 3, at 30 (“Most education 
and healthcare has been decentralized to state governments, and municipalities are 
responsible for most basic city and county services.”).  
38. A reform proposal that has gained prominence would create an administrative 
agency or independent commission to set visa policy on an annual basis, in the interest of 
creating an agile labor policy mechanism attuned to facts on the ground.  Interagency 
communication across the U.S.-Mexico border will be crucial to the information-gathering 
work of such a commission.  For a discussion of the commission proposal, see Cox & 
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already focuses on the rights and interests of Mexican nationals in the 
United States, could be cultivated and enlisted in identifying and 
helping to satisfy the particular needs of migrants, and perhaps also in 
monitoring employer-employee relations.  Indeed, federal policymakers, 
as well as state and local officials, should regard the civil society networks 
that have emerged over the last two decades as crucial resources for 
providing for immigrant welfare and promoting immigrant integration.  
The hometown associations’ and Mexican Institute’s simultaneous focus 
on promoting attachments to Mexico and encouraging community 
participation and English-language learning in the United States 
provides an essential model for addressing the inherent tension between 
wanting to encourage some migrants to return and ensuring that those 
who inevitably stay for long periods (or forever) integrate successfully. 
* * * 
To varying degrees, these transnational schemes amount to the 
extension of sovereignty across borders and the intermingling of 
different sovereign regimes.  They thus implicate one of the central 
concerns surrounding global governance:  accountability to the public.  
Migration scuttles the social contract on both sides of the border, 
making one government’s decisions consequential for the citizens of the 
other state.  This discussion thus surfaces a question that must be 
addressed in the shift toward a burden-sharing and management model 
of migration:  How do we simultaneously address cross-border regulatory 
challenges and ensure that the publics on both sides of the border have 
adequate voice in what is done?  Crucially, this accountability must 
extend not just from the state to its own citizens, but from the United 
States government to the people of Mexico and the government of 
Mexico to the people of the United States. 
Interdependence, which is often invoked in the rhetoric that 
surrounds diplomacy, must ultimately be a core presumption of actual 
reform debates, and lawmakers ought to make concerted efforts to 
solidify bilateralism as a working practice.  Building transnational 
networks with ties to public institutions on either side of the border 
ultimately will promote accountability in immigration policy by ensuring 
the participation of representatives from both nations in the myriad 
decisionmaking processes that involve an increasingly transnational 
public.  
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